# The PoSW Predicate

The predicate used as part of the PoSW circuit verifies the inclusion of transactions in a given block. The various building blocks are defined below alongside the relevant implementation parameters.

## System State​

The state of the system is given by a Merkle tree Tree_G(h) of depth h over a CRT function G: {0, 1}^k -> {0, 1}^(k/2), where G is taken to be SHA-256 with k = 512. We denote this as the "state tree". Each leaf is the unique ID of a transaction to be processed, and the variable state is the root of the tree.

The PoSW circuit takes the q <= d subtree of the state tree and computes a Merkle tree of depth q. The leaves of the tree are the depth q elements of the state tree Tree_H(h), instantiated over k-bit leaves with a different CRT function H: {0, 1}^k -> {0, 1}^(k/2) as a new PoSW tree Tree_H(q). This layout is illustrated in the diagram on the left. For example, for G = BLS12_377 we set H as the 512-bit Pedersen CRH with output truncated to 256 bits.

The circuit implementation for H masks the witness variables based on a pseudorandom seed, which is part of the predicate statement. This is required to achieve non-amortization guarantees. We set q = 3 throughout.

## Pedersen Primitives​

The k-bit Pedersen hash function over G is a CRT hash given by:

H(G, x) = ∏_{for i = 1..k} G_i^{x_i}

where G_i in G are randomly sampled generators and x_i the i-th input bit of x. CRT security of this function reduces to the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over the group G.

The above function can be evaluated in a 'masked' fashion, using the primitives below.

The $k$-bit symmetric Pedersen hash is defined with the same security guarantees as H: {0, 1}^k -> G where:

H_sym(H, rho) = ∏_{for i = 1..k} H_i^{1 - 2 * rho_i}

#### Circuit Structure​

Define group variables Q = (Q_x, Q_y), h_i = (h^i_x, h^i_y) in (F_p^2)^k. Check the following evaluations:

• If rho_i = 0, set h_i = H_i, else if rho_i = 1 set to h_i = H_i^{-1}.
• Q_0 is the identity and Q_i = Q_{i-1} * h_i.

This requires k Edwards multiplications (6 constraints each), and a bit lookup for each of the h_i in addition to k booleanity checks.

This is evaluated by precomputed_base_symmetric_multiscalar_mul in PedersenCRHGadget.

The k-length masked Pedersen hash function over G is a CRT hash function H_mask: {0, 1}^k x {0, 1}^k x G -> G given by:

H_mask^{G, H}(rho, x, P) = P * ∏_{for i = 1..k} (1[x_i (+) rho_i = 1] G_i^{2 * x_i - 1} H_i^{2 * rho_i - 1} + 1[x_i (+) rho_i = 0] H_i^{2 * rho_i - 1})

where x_i and rho_i the i-th bits of x and rho respectively, while G_i in G are randomly sampled generators of G and (+) the bitwise XOR operation. The variable P in G is appended as an input as well, for the demasking operation.

#### Circuit Structure​

Define group variables Q = (Q_x, Q_y), g_i = (g^i_x, g^i_y) in (F_p^2)^k and boolean variables z in F_p^k. Perform the following evaluations:

• With a 2-bit lookup, for all i in [k] set g_i :=
• H_i^{-1} if rho_i = 0 and x_i = 0
• H_i if $\rho_i = 1$ and $x_i = 1$
• G_i * H_i^{-1} if rho_i = 1 and x_i = 0
• G_i^{-1} * H_i if rho_i = 0 and x_i = 1
• Q_0 = P and Q_i = Q_{i-1} * g_i.

This requires k Edwards multiplications (6 constraints each), a 2-bit lookup for each of the g_i (2 constraints each) and k booleanity checks.

This is evaluated by precomputed_base_scalar_mul_masked in PedersenCRHGadget.

We instantiate a circuit verifying M evaluations of H^G using circuits for H_mask^{G,H} and H_sym^H over G. Note that elements are variables in F_p, while pairs of variables (z_x,z_y) in F_p^2 are parsed as elliptic curve points in G. We presume that the H_i, G_i in G have been precomputed and are accessible as constants.

#### Inputs​

The k-length masked evaluation of M Pedersen hashes takes as inputs:

• For i in [ M ], boolean variables x^i = {x^i_1, .., x^i_k}.
• A boolean seed rho in {0, 1}^k that is a subset of F^k_p.

#### Evaluations​

• Set z <- H_sym^{H}(rho).
• For all i in [M], set (o^x_i, o_i^y) = H_mask^{G,H}(rho, x^i, z).

#### Outputs​

The k/2 length set of variables {o^1_x, ..., o^k_x} in (F_p)^k as the truncated outputs.

### Instantiation​

We use BLS12-377 as the underlying group, which implies an output length of 256+1 = 257 bits (using point-compression) which we truncate to 256 bits. Security reduction to the hardness of ECDLP yields a security level of lambda ~= 128 bits. The input length is set to k = 512 bits.

## PoSW Circuit​

The PoSW tree Tree_H(q) takes in the subroots of the state tree's q-depth nodes as leaves, and uses the k-bit Pedersen hash gadget with respect to a seed parameter rho to compute the root state_i. The seed parameter rho = PRF(state_i || n) is the output of a pseudorandom function PRF with boolean inputs, the nonce n and the tree root.

### Seed Generation​

We generate the seed rho in the following way for each predicate:

1. Given input nonce n in {0, 1}^256 and state_i in {0, 1}^256, compute rho_0 in {0, 1}^256 as rho_0 = BLAKE(n || state_i), where || represents string concatenation.

2. If the i-th bit rho_{0, i} of rho_0 is 0 or 1, set the (2i-1)-th and 2i-th bits of rho as 10 or 01 respectively. This gives a rho in {0, 1}^512 of constant Hamming distance 256.

This is all done outside of the circuit, and is required input format for every valid instance.

### Circuit Size​

#### Statement-Witness Definition​

A valid statement phi = <state_i, n> in {0, 1}^{512} as a subset of F_p^512, where:

1. state_i in {0, 1}^256 the bitwise representation of the PoSW root node of the updated state variable.
2. n in {0, 1}^256 the bitwise representation of the nonce.

The witness w for the above statement consists of:

1. A boolean representation of rho in {0, 1}^512.

2. The subroot leaves {x_i}_{i = 1}^{2^q}, x_i in {0, 1}^512 corresponding to state_i.

3. Boolean representations of the intermediate node values of Tree_H(q).

#### Evaluations​

For the root state_i and all internal nodes of Tree_H(q), perform a computation of the H gadget with the node value as output and its children as inputs.

The PoSW circuit verifies that Tree_H(q) is correctly generated. This requires the computation of 2^{q-1} + 1 instances of H.